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JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH PAPER

Joint Special Operations Task Force Communications:
Tenets for Successful Operational Communications in Military Operations Other Than War

by

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Seminar 01

A paper respectfully submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Joint Military Operations Course.


I have previously written about Special Operations Communications both at the Naval War College and in the military; therefore, portions of the historical materials presented are reiterations of substantially similar chronologies I have personally written.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal and professional views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of Defense.

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15. Abstract: In many cases Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the first to arrive in the area of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Characteristically joint in nature and featuring strategic, operational and tactical considerations a MOOTW can be politically sensitive and require that the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the National Command Authority (NCA) be kept well- informed. Therefore, it is critical that the Joint Special operations Task Force (JSOTF) conducting a MOOTW have reliable communications from the tactical through the strategic level. This paper identifies authoritative guidance and resources available, develops practical tenets, and applies operational art to assist the reader in understanding and planning reliable JSOTF communications in support of MOOTW.			
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Introduction

In many cases, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the first to arrive in the area of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Characteristically joint in nature and featuring “strategic, operational and tactical considerations”¹ a MOOTW can be politically sensitive and require that the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the National Command Authority (NCA) be kept well-informed. Therefore, it is critical that the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) conducting a MOOTW have reliable communications from the tactical through the strategic level.

My approach is to identify the authoritative guidance and resources available, develop practical tenets, and apply operational art to assist a reader in understanding and planning reliable JSOTF communications in support of MOOTW.

I have used my recent MOOTW experiences to analyze and define a practical methodology to assist commanders and planners in developing JSOTF operational communications. This methodology is based on a set of tenets to guide communications planners. The tenets are Force Selection, Force Preparation, Unit Integrity, and Communications Flexibility.

There are normally multiple components under a Joint Task Force. Service components of a Joint Task Force (JTF), such as an Army Force (ARFOR), Navy Force (NAVFOR), Air Force Force (AFFOR), and Marine Force (MARFOR) normally have communications/signal units organic to their force or habitually associated with their headquarters to provide their communications support. The ARFOR, NAVFOR, AFFOR, and MARFOR

¹Joint Pub 3-0. pg V-1, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington, D.C. 01 February 1995

communications/signal units provide communications connectivity into either the Theater Communications System (TCS) or the Defense Communications System (DCS) as well as within their respective forces. The one JTF component that does not have the benefit of being a service component is the JSOTF.

The Commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (COMJSOTF) must have reliable communications to successfully command, control and conduct special operations in support of the JTF Commander's deliberate plan or crisis action operation; this is also true in MOOTW. COMJSOTF must integrate and synchronize special operations with conventional operations to enable the JTF Commander to successfully accomplish the assigned mission. This paper has been written to propose how to effectively and efficiently provide assured operational communications for JSOTF Commanders in support of MOOTW.

Background

The Theater Special Operations Commands (SOC) are relatively new. They were formed in the 1980's by congressional direction. The story began with the Congress recommending that the services increase the funding and priority given to their Special Operations Forces. The services delayed taking action on the congressional recommendation; hence, the Congress reiterated the recommendation and provided funds for specific SOF programs. The services reallocated some of the funds to main-stream programs while the SOF programs remained underfunded, resulting in a lack of SOF readiness. Congress felt there was reluctance to increase funding and priority due to the mainstream background of the flag officers and their propensity to put priority and funding into mainstream service forces. Whatever the reason, it became a moot point because Congress enacted legislation taking percentages from the Army, Navy, and Air Force Major Force Program Two (MFP-2) funds for their General Purpose

Forces, and establishing a Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) fund dedicated specifically for Special Operations Forces. Congress also legislated a new Unified Command, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) under the Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (CINCSOC). "Congress created USSOCOM in 1987 to correct serious deficiencies in the United States' ability to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict activities."² Congress further legislated that there would be a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) in each Regional Unified Command and that the TSOC would be commanded by a flag officer.

Since the establishment of MFP-11 and USSOCOM, the road has been much smoother for most SOF. "The creation of USSOCOM has had a significant impact on the training and readiness of the special operations forces in the Army, Navy, and Air Force."³ Most have been better funded and given sufficient priority to significantly increase their capabilities and readiness; however, the TSOC has had a harder road to travel. The TSOCs, as Sub-unified commands under the Regional Unified Commands initially were funded and supported by the same method as the Regional Unified Commands. Under DOD Instruction 5100.3⁴, each Regional Unified Command has been assigned a supporting service. Thus, the Pacific Command and Atlantic Command are supported by the Navy, the Central Command is supported by the Air Force, and the European Command and Southern Command are supported by the Army. The supporting service funds and supports the Regional Unified Command and its related Sub-Unified Commands.

²United States Special Operations Forces 1996 Posture Statement, pg 1, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL

³Boykin, Col William G., "The Origins of the United States Special Operations Command," pg 19, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL

⁴DOD 5100.3, 1980, Designated the services responsible for support of the CINCs: USAF supports CENTCOM; USN supports LANTCOM & PACOM, and USA supports EUCOM & SOUTHCOM.

Then in 1983, the Secretary of Defense tasked the services to enhance Special Operations Forces.⁵ In 1984 the JCS directed that, in regard to the TSOC's communications requirements, "The service responsible for support of the respective CINC outlined in 1980 DOD 5100.3 will provide communications connectivity."⁶ In response, the Army diligently developed a SOF master plan, which included a signal battalion to provide communications for Army SOF and to meet its responsibilities under DOD 5100.3⁷ to provide communications for Special Operations Command - Europe (SOCEUR) and Special Operations Command - South (SOCSOUTH), the TSOCs of the two Army supported CINCs, CINCEUR and CINCSOUTH. The United States Army Force Integration Survey Agency (USAFISA) conducted a mission assessment and established a personnel requirement of 586 soldiers, the equivalent of a signal battalion in an Army division. Since the Army Signal Corps was drawing down based on the fielding of Mobile Subscriber Equipment, the Signal Corps provided SOF with 278 signal spaces.⁸ In 1986, the Army used these spaces to activate the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in order to provide deployable communications for SOCEUR and SOCSOUTH simultaneously.

The execution of the funding and support varied significantly in the other TSOCs. The Air Force funded the Special Operations Command - Central (SOCCENT) at a barely adequate level, taking the position that the two Air National Guard Communications Squadrons associated with the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) and the two Air National Guard Communications Squadrons associated with USSOCOM could and should be used to meet SOCCENT's requirements for reliable communications in their role as a deployed

⁵SECDEF MEMO, 1983, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, tasked DOD AGENCIES to take action to enhance SOF no later than FY 90.

⁶JCS MSG, 1984, MROC for improved SOF communication.

⁷DA SOF Master Plan, 1984.

⁸Signal Corps Functional Area Assessment, 1984.

JSOTF. The Air Force emphasized the practicality of this arrangement since JCSE, SOCCENT, and USSOCOM were co-located on MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

The Navy funded Special Operations Command - Pacific (SOCPAC) and Special Operations Command - Atlantic (SOCLANT) at inadequate levels. Furthermore, the Navy did not acknowledge its responsibility to provide SOCPAC or SOCLANT with deployable communications when deployed as a JSOTF headquarters.

USSOCOM's position was that the USSOCOM headquarters could deploy into a theater and form a JSOTF headquarters to command and control joint special operations forces, and that Theater SOCs were not SOF. Therefore, the TSOCs should not be supported or funded with MFP-11 funds. Bureaucratic resistance to accept the directive that Regional CINCs are warfighters (to be supported) and that the services and USSOCOM are supporters (in support of) was firmly entrenched. Eventually, in 1992, Congress again got involved, by slightly decreasing service funding, slightly increasing USSOCOM funding, and directing that USSOCOM fund and support the TSOCs with, among other capabilities, deployable communications.⁹

Then, as the Soviet Union dissolved, the United States reassessed the threat; the thrust of the national defense strategy began to evolve into being prepared to fight and win two Major Regional Contingencies nearly simultaneously. The responsibility for communications support now clearly belonged to USSOCOM as a result of congressional direction and also as established in Joint Pub 6-0, which states,

⁹FY92 Defense Authorization Bill, 1992, Congress directs DOD to resource and support Theater SOCs with MFP-11 funds.

“Each service and USCINCSOC has the following responsibilities and implements them through organizations discussed below...

- a. To provide, operate and maintain the C4 facilities organic to its own tactical forces...**
- b. To provide operate and maintain terminal equipment...**
- c. To provide operate and maintain interoperable and compatible C4 systems...**
- d. To provide the capability for interface of non-DISN (Defense Information Systems Network) facilities.**
- e. To provide the combatant commands with Service C4 system and connectivity requirements...”¹⁰**

Because of this and because the Navy and the Air Force had never dedicated any assets to specifically support the TSOCs, USSOCOM coordinated for the 112th Signal Battalion to be globally apportioned and increased the battalion in strength to 324 soldiers. This enabled all TSOC Commanders to have access to the battalion for JSOTF support.

The 112th Signal Battalion is a MFP-11 USSOCOM Special Operations Force and an Army Unit, the same as any active duty Army Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, or Psychological Operations Battalion. “The mission of the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) is to provide operational and tactical communications for JSOTF Commanders in support of major regional contingency operations in up to two theaters simultaneously.”¹¹ Noteworthy to remember, this does not only mean connectivity from the JSOTF headquarters into the strategic systems, such as the DCS, it also means connectivity from the JSOTF headquarters to the Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF), the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC), and the Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU).

¹⁰Joint Pub 6-0, pp IV--2 & 3, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4)

Systems Support to Joint Operations. Washington, D.C. 30 May 1995 (**original bold**, my DISN definition)

¹¹112th Signal Battalion (Airborne) Command Brief, 1996.

The 112th also supports Army Special Operations Forces such as Ranger, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units with assets that are not already committed to JSOTF Commanders.

The 112th originally consisted of a Battalion Headquarters, a Headquarters Company, and two Signal Operations Companies. In early 1996, the 112th Signal Battalion established overseas detachments at SOCSOUTH, SOCPAC, and Special Operations Command-Korea (SOCKOR) to provide quick reaction, deployable communications for the TSOCs on short notice contingency operations. The COMSOCs were very happy to have their own dedicated Signal Detachments.

In contrast, SOCEUR initially did not want to take its 15-soldier 112th Signal Detachment because it was smaller than the 40-soldier Signal Support Detachment (SSD) that USAREUR provides to support SOCEUR and CINCEUR. Some of SOCEUR's concerns are that the current SSD is used to man a radio room which terminates single channel satellite radio, secure facsimile, and data transfer on a 24-hour basis and it provides teams of radio operators to operate multiple single-channel radio nets that provide initial connectivity on contingency deployments. The soldiers in the SSD are assigned to the 52d Signal Battalion, a strategic, fixed station signal unit with a garrison support mission. The 52nd is funded with Army MFP-2 General Purpose Forces funds. The 52d is a good unit; however, it has experienced mission creep. In a time when force reductions are always a concern, it is understandable that this unit is looking for additional missions. While it is convenient that the 52nd is located at Patch Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, as is SOCEUR, it is not effective or efficient to continuously divert manpower for this purpose.

Much of the equipment that the SSD operates is MFP-11 funded equipment provided by USSOCOM to SOCEUR. This provision of MFP-11 funded equipment to SOCEUR, and operated by MFP-2 funded personnel in support of SOCEUR or CINCEUR, may not meet congressional intent. Also, the 52nd Signal Battalion does not have tactical communications assets to support the entire scope of the requirements for SOCEUR, nor does it have a mission to do so. The reason so many 52nd single-channel operators are required for so many single channel nets are that multi-channel assets are not available. With the 112th Signal Detachment single channel teams can terminate the actual required nets while a multi-channel teams provide connectivity through the DCS for multiple STU-III telephones, secure LAN, JDISS, and DDN (AUTODIN) over the Ground Mobile Force Tactical Satellite Terminal. Survey teams can use the detachment for support or to train up on the user operated pieces of equipment. The 52nd force structure diverted to support SOCEUR could be used by USAREUR for its primary or other missions, or it could be cut as a manpower/cost saving.

Additional detachments are being formed within the 112th Signal Battalion from its current authorization (no additional manpower required) to field a detachment to SOCCENT and possibly two detachments for SOCEUR recognizing it has two continents, Europe and Africa, to cover. Both the active and the reserve components of the JCSE have provided communications support for SOCCENT to some extent in the past. The JCSE has both JTF and JSOTF support in their mission statement. JCSE has a battalion size active component and two Air National Guard Communications Squadrons. Originally, the JCSE active component had two companies designated JTF Companies and the Air National Guard Communications Squadrons were designated JSOTF Squadrons. Currently JCSE is moving to establish a dedicated element in their active component for JSOTF support.

Although, doctrinally all Regional CINCs have equal access to JCSE, JCSE has a special relationship with United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and USSOCOM, all located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The Commander of JCSE is evaluated through the J6 Directorate of USCENTCOM and JCSE's annual training budget is provided through USCENTCOM. Thus, it is no surprise that JCSE's training funds are normally expended for exercises in CENTCOM and that exercise support by JCSE in other theaters requires funding by the supported theater. In most cases it is impractical for other theater CINC's to routinely train with or use JCSE. Another example is that JCSE's vehicles and systems are painted desert camouflage. While CENTCOM requires desert camouflage, USACOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM mainly require woodland blend camouflage, this is an indicator that JCSE is clearly focused on CENTCOM. Doctrine prescribes the procedure a CINC can use to request JCSE support through the Joint Staff, since JCSE is a JCS controlled asset. Doctrine prescribes that all warfighting CINCs have access to this asset on an equal as required basis. In reality, the JCSE are used most extensively in support of CENTCOM. JCSE has supported SOCLANT on exercises, but when Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was executed, it was the 112th, rather than JCSE, that supported the JSOTF throughout Haiti.

SOCENT has, on occasion, deployed into CENTCOM as a JSOTF headquarters expecting JCSE support. The JSOTF requires early support since many special operations take place on or before D-Day. On occasion, however, the JCSE has not deployed until the CENTCOM headquarters deployed. Its priority was to install the JTF's communications; only after this was accomplished did the JCSE install the JSOTF's communications -- either late or as they were redeploying from theater. When JCSE provides major JTF and JSOTF support in CENTCOM, it leaves only its Air National Guard Communications Squadrons to be prepared

for a second contingency. Although JCSE is a top notch unit, command relationships and mission creep are creating inefficiencies in its ability to support any Regional CINCs except CINCCENT.

The establishment of additional 112th Signal Detachments at SOCCENT and SOCEUR will provide a responsive, dedicated quick reaction communications capability for both SOC's. The 112th Signal Battalion (-) follow-on force would meet the SOC's requirements during a MOOTW. A lot of this could be clarified by deleting JSOTF support from JCSE's mission. After all, the JCSE is capable of fully supporting two full up headquarters simultaneously, either two JTFs, two JSOTFs, or one JTF and one JSOTF. By deleting JCSE's JSOTF mission, JCSE's active component could be fully dedicated to JTFs and the two Air National Guard Communications Squadrons could be eliminated, avoiding force structure and future maintenance costs. USSOCOM also has two Air National Guard Communications Squadrons, originally tasked to support CINCSOC's possible role as a warfighting CINC; this role, however, has never materialized. And, even if CINCSOC was called upon as a warfighting CINC in his increasingly important role in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the communications proficiency and response time required would preclude the use of an Air National Guard Communications Squadron. Thus, these squadrons could be eliminated, avoiding force structure and future maintenance costs.

Comparision

Contrasts between 112th JSOTF support versus JCSE JSOTF support are numerous. A short comparison follows. The TSOCs have to request JCSE support through their regional Unified Command and the Joint Staff. This process can be unresponsive in real time processing, and impractical in execution. In order to justify the use of a JCS controlled asset

the Unified Command must verify that it can not meet the requirements from forces under its Combatant Command (COCOM). Even if approved, the support is limited to ninety days, at which time the assets must be replaced by the theater and returned, or an extension requested. This significantly limits the flexibility of COMJSOTF on the practical use of these assets. JCSE is consolidated at MacDill Air Force Base and there are no forward based detachments; therefore, with the possible exception of SOCCENT, no communications element can deploy with the initial JSOTF elements. JCSE has no direct support supporting service component in theater; therefore, the JSOTF must coordinate and provide logistics support for the JCSE deployed element, which decreases the reliability of logistics support and distracts the JSOTF from its mission.

On the other hand, the TSOCs request 112th support through their regional Unified Command and USSOCOM. The 112th currently has forward signal detachments at three of the SOC's. Additional forward stationed detachments are planned, making it possible for a signal detachment to deploy with the initial JSOTF elements.

Justification for additional 112th Signal Battalion support is the deployment of a JSOTF requiring signal support larger than its forward stationed signal detachment can provide. This justification is sufficient, since it is doctrinally USSOCOM's responsibility to provide the TSOC with deployed communications, and procedurally it is very responsive to the TSOC's needs. The 112th's annual training funds can be and are used in any region to train to standard. Once USSOCOM tasks the 112th to support the mission there is no time limitation; however, for missions longer than one year, commercial replacement of high capacity systems is considered. This significantly increases the flexibility of COMJSOTF on the use of these

assets. CINCSOC has a service support Memorandum of Agreement with each of the services. It provides for service support of SOF on a non-reimbursable basis when deployed into regional Unified Commands. This means that the Army component within a Unified Command supplies Army common items to the 112th on a non-reimbursable basis. This is more practical for a JSOTF with no dedicated logistics support and keeps COMJSOTF focused on the primary mission, while it increases the reliability of signal logistics support.

Force modernization and funding significantly differ between the 112th and the JCSE. The philosophy at USSOCOM for modernization is "We do not develop technology unless we absolutely have to. We try to use technologies that others have developed, then influence or leverage those to adapt them to what we think the future operational requirements for our Special Operational Forces are."¹² USSOCOM budgets for SOF. The 112th is budgeted under the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Army component of USSOCOM. It has both MFP-11 funded, special operations communications equipment, and MFP-2 funded, Army communications equipment. When the Army modernizes its equipment the 112th's Army common equipment is modernized. This means that any modification, rebuild program, or new equipment fielding that the Army conducts is also funded and conducted for the 112th. Although JCSE has a large and ample budget with funding contributions from all of the services, it does not have a dedicated service giving it this kind of support.

Ground Mobile Force Tactical Satellite (GMF TACSAT) terminals are a good example. In the 112th and the JCSE the GMF TACSAT terminals were originally mounted on Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCVs) with dual wheels in the rear. When the Army fielded High

¹²United States Special Operations Forces 1996 Posture Statement, pg 6, Quote from Gary L. Smith, Acquisition Executive, USSOCOM, MacDill AFB, FL

Mobility Motorized Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), they were fielded to the 112th and put under their GMF TACSAT terminals, providing increased mobility and reliability. JCSE's GMF TACSATs are still mounted on the CUCV series vehicles. In the 112th and the JCSE the GMF TACSAT terminals were originally powered by 10 KW generators, which were unreliable, inefficient and noisy. When the Army fielded replacement Quiet Reliable Generators, the 112th Signal Battalion was completely equipped with the new units and all battalion GMF TACSAT terminals are now powered by them. JCSE's GMF TACSAT terminals still use the old series 10 KW generators. The 112th will also benefit from the fielding of Army common systems such as the Integrated System Control (ISYSCON), an automated digital network control assemblage; the Super High Frequency Tri-band Advanced Range Extension Terminal (STAR-T), a tri-band multichannel satellite system; the Secure Mobile Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T), a MILSTAR Extra High Frequency multi-channel satellite terminal; the Single Channel Anti-jam Man Portable (SCAMP), a MILSTAR Extra High Frequency multi-channel satellite system; the Lightweight High Gain Expandable Antenna (LHGXA), a HMMWV towed high gain antenna for GMF TACSAT; the Fly Away Message Switch, a HMMWV mounted DDN switch, communications center, and local area network server; a Secure On-board Man Portable System (SECOMPS), a system that provides communications for the task force commander while enroute to the contingency or when moving within the contingency area on military air lift; and Enhanced Man Portable Ultra High Frequency Terminal (EMUT), a single channel satellite system with demand access capability.

SOF MFP-11 programs that have been or will be fielded to the 112th include, but are not limited to the Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA), the Compartmented

ASAS (All Source Analysis System) Message Processing System (CAMPS), and the Deployable SCAMPI (name, not an acronym), a dynamic band width management system that allows for band width use on demand. Although JCSE has received some MFP-11 funded equipment from USSOCOM, the compliance with congressional direction and intent for the use of these funds is unclear.

Possibilities for clearing up some of the fog and friction

By the very nature of the support required, and the amount of JCSE's resources, JCSE's active component is limited to meeting JTF requirements. JCSE's Air National Guard Communications Squadrons can not maintain a readiness posture or forward presence to meet JSOTF requirements. The SSD is not capable of providing full JSOTF support and its parent unit, the 52nd can meet out the JSOTF's total communications requirements. The 112th is clearly structured, postured, and ready to execute the JSOTF mission now.

If an Armed Force is to maintain its credibility, it must identify mission overlap and take the lead in resolving the overlap and eliminating redundant or sub-optimum forces. The 112th should have a signal detachment at each TSOC to provide quick reaction contingency communications, with the battalion at Fort Bragg prepared to deploy to two theaters nearly simultaneously to provide reliable communications for COMJSOTFs conducting Special Operations in support of a Regional CINC's deliberate plan or crisis action operations. The appropriate Joint Publications should reflect the 112th as the signal support unit for all JSOTFs and outline the procedures for coordinating support. References to JCSE providing JSOTF support should be deleted from JCSE's mission and Joint Publications. USSOCOM should not provide MFP-11 funded communications equipment to non-SOF units. Furthermore, JCSE's rating and funding relationships with CENTCOM should be reconsidered and revised

to facilitate easier and equitable access by all the warfighting CINCs for JTF support. The Air National Guard Communications Squadrons associated with JCSE and USSOCOM should be considered for elimination or realignment. The EUCOM SSD at SOCEUR should be replaced by two 112th Signal Detachments and the 52nd Signal Battalion should either reallocate its soldiers to its fixed station mission or reduce the manpower spaces on its authorization document. A comprehensive analysis of the status quo clearly shows that the overlaps in mission areas can not be ignored.

Tenets

In preparing and executing operational communications for a JSOTF on MOOTW, I have observed certain tenets that are of particular importance to success. They are Force Selection, Force Preparation, Unit Integrity, and Communications Flexibility.

Force Selection is determined by the supported commander. It is essential that the preceding discussion be considered. Although there are many units capable of providing JSOTFs with communications, there is only one that is clearly structured, postured, and ready to do the JSOTF mission now. Operation duration, capability, availability, and the other three tenets must all be considered.

The second tenet, Force Preparation, is a two faceted process. It is crucial that commands are proactive in both of these processes. One facet is preparing the communications unit to deploy and employ its communications systems efficiently. This is done by realistic training and development. It starts with instilling military values into the soldiers and fulfilling the soldier's desire for personal accomplishment. The focus of all training must be its relationship

to actually accomplishing a mission. Operations are more important than exercises. The sole purpose of exercises is to prepare for operations. Hence, soldiers must be rewarded for good performance, but the rewards must always be higher for operations. This helps reenforce and create the desire of soldiers to deploy on operations and do their best. Soldiers must train as they will perform on operations; there can be no other way. Unit integrity in training is important and must be maintained whether training for war or for MOOTW. These are basics, but too often they are sacrificed for expedience.

The first priority is equipping the force and maintaining accountability of all equipment. A well trained unit can not communicate without its equipment. Second priority is maintenance of equipment. A well trained unit can not communicate with its equipment if it doesn't work. Third is training, since a unit can furnish, install, operate, and maintain its communications systems even with some training shortfalls if it in fact has all its equipment and it is operational. This can be done because the noncommissioned officers can continue to do training even during deployment and employment and install, operate, or maintain equipment to resolve operator training shortfalls. Once a unit is trained to perform its mission, it must understand the commanders intent for the specific operation. Due to the nature of JSOTF communications the commander's intent on each operation is similar. It is to provide uninterrupted operational communications to command and control the JSOTF.

The second facet of force preparation is developing the communications plan and establishing command relationships. It is assumed in this paper that the 112th is the force that will provide communications to the JSOTF during MOOTW; therefore, the planning and command relationships cited are in accordance with special operations doctrine. However, if a different unit was chosen, this tenet would still be valid. Integration of JSOTF tactical

communications with the DCS and TCS is critical; therefore, the battalion must coordinate closely with the SOC J6 Communications Directorate, the Joint Task Force Joint Communications Control Center (JTF JCCC), the Service Component Command Communications Officer, and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). The 112th provides signal planners to liaise with or augment the JSOTF J6 and the JTF JCCC. Integration is further enhanced by the formation of the JSOTF JCCC. The 112th furnishes the nucleus of the JSOTF JCCC. The JSOTF JCCC manages databases, programming, wiring, and debugging of signal systems, as well as integrates Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and SOF signal systems, special circuits and automation into the JSOTF communications system. The role of these staff signal officers and noncommissioned officers is to plan and engineer JSOTF communications to meet COMSOC/COMJSOTF validated communications requirements, minimize disruption of services to JSOTF subscribers and preclude duplication of effort by signal units. These planners are crucial to maintaining the COMJSOTF's unity of effort and operations tempo, while maximizing the use of limited resources.

In establishing command relationships the 112th, upon entry into a theater, is COCOM to the supported theater CINC. The supported JSOTF Commander exercises OPCON of the 112th. The theater Army exercises ADCON of the 112th, through the ARSOTF if a regiment, brigade, or group. The JSOTF JCCC exercises technical control (TECH CON) within the authority granted to it by the JSOTF Commander and the JTF JCCC over the JSOTF communications system. The battalion exercises OPCON of its subordinate elements within the JSOTF. Both facets of force preparation are essential for the success of the operation. Commonly, problems occur when commanders of elements within the JSOTF do not follow the command relationships or confuse communications requirements with specific pieces of

equipment. This results in unit integrity being discarded and communications flexibility being eliminated.

The third tenet, Unit Integrity, is also essential for assured operational communications. The systems in a communication unit are normally established in layers with complementary capabilities. Optimal employment of these systems requires a support system that only a battalion headquarters and headquarters company can provide. Requirements for communications should be identified by what type information is required at what location, and by when. System planners plan for units to provide install, operate, and maintain communications systems to support those requirements. A robust system that features layering and alternate routing is necessary to prevent outages. If a component of a system fails at a single point, that failure should not keep information from getting to the desired user. Multiple routes, means, and redundancies minimize the effect of a single point failure by providing alternative paths for the information. When a system does fail it must be restored as quickly as possible to ensure the robustness and flexibility of the JSOTFs communications system. Although many units have interoperable or compatible communications equipment, one of the most common mistakes that leads to communications failures is commanders electing to put together ad hoc organizations composed of multiple communications units to provide pieces of their operational communications. This undermines command and control relationships, administrative and personnel support for the communicators, logistics support, flexibility and the strength that intact units inherently possess. Even the Joint Pub on Military Operations Other than War acknowledges that **“US forces train as units, and are best able to accomplish a mission when deployed intact.”**¹³ Communications from the tactical through the operational to the strategic level can be seamless and robust, assuring operational

¹³Joint Pub 3--07, pp IV--1, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Washington, D.C.

16 June 1995.

communications for the JSOTF Commander by adhering to the basic tenet of unit integrity.

Communications Flexibility is the third tenet. This is achieved by stating requirements and then allowing communications planners to furnish primary, secondary, and tertiary systems in a robust multi-means architecture that can absorb many of the natural disasters, man-made disasters, and changes to the employment of forces as the mission either expands or diminishes. "Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided."¹⁴ This is done by not limiting the communications unit commander's options. Other than face to face coordination, there are very few ways to command and control any operational task force other than over operational communications. In MOOTW, COMJSOTF must have options to respond to the uncertainty of the situation; the best way to keep those options open is to have operational communications flexibility.

The 112th has recently provided operational communications for JSOTFs on Military Operations Other Than War that have included Peacekeeping Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II in Iraq; Peacekeeping, Nation Building, and Humanitarian Assistance Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti; Peacekeeping Operation SAFE BORDER in Ecuador; Peacekeeping, No-Fly Zone enforcement, and Humanitarian Assistance Operations PROVIDE PROMISE, DENY FLIGHT, and JOINT ENDEAVOR in the former Yugoslavia; Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia; and the demining mission in Rwanda. In addition, 112th training support for JSOTFs has included Joint Readiness Exercises (JRX) Ulchi-Focus Lens and Foal Eagle in Korea; Strong Resolve in Norway;

¹⁴Joint Pub 3--07, pp IV--4 & 5, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Washington, D.C. 16 June 1995.

Noble Rose in Israel; Cobra Gold in Thailand; Flintlock II in Zimbabwe; Atlantic Resolve and Mountain Shield in Germany; Fuertas Defenses and Cabanas in Panama; and Early Victor in Jordan; as well as multiple rotations of Special Operations Forces at the Joint Readiness Training Center. Each and every mission had reliable operational communications as the direct result of the superb efforts of the deployed 112th Signal Battalion soldiers and the application of the four tenets. Success for JSOTF Commanders means they are able to meet the requirements of the nation and demonstrate the capability of the United States to achieve a wide range of national objectives.

Conclusion

As previously stated, in many cases, Special Operations Forces are the first to arrive in the area of MOOTW. JSOTFs conducting a MOOTW must have reliable communications from the tactical through the strategic level. As described in this paper, an effective methodology to guide communications planners to successfully provide operational communications includes the tenets of Force Selection, Force Preparation, Unit Integrity, and Communications Flexibility. Leaning forward in these areas will enhance the probability of successful operational communications and significantly contribute to JSOTF mission accomplishment which, in turn will better lead to the achievement of national objectives and United States foreign policy.

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